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A Note on the Computation of the Pre-Kernel
1 INTRODUCTION
Although the axiomatic foundation of the pre-kernel made during the last decades a considerable progress,
and even the computational aspects of singling out a pre-kernel point by an efficient and systematical
method was satisfactorily solved by the recent book of Meinhardt (2013d), the determination of a non-
convex pre-kernel is still a challenge full of possible pitfalls, even to the experienced researcher. But even
when the connected parts of the pre-kernel get correctly specified, there still exists the possibility that a
disconnected part has been overlooked. According to our knowledge the sole example of a disconnected
pre-kernel have been studied by Kopelowitz (1967); Stearns (1968), we have nevertheless found some
evidence that a disconnected pre-kernel occurs more frequently than expected. Not for TU games with
a sufficient symmetrical structure as in many examples presented in the literature, but for games with
loose symmetries among coalitions. The more asymmetries one has to consider the more challenging is
the determination of the pre-kernel for games with more than 4 players, and some parts could get easily
overlooked as in the case of the recent publication by Solymosi (2014). There, for a five person game from
the class of permutation games a pre-kernel was specified as a non convex V-shaped set. However, it is in
fact N-shaped as we shall see.
In this note we shall delineate a procedure of how we can correctly determine the pre-kernel for permu-
tation games. One aspect of finding the whole pre-kernel is to rely on pre-kernel catchers. In the literature,
several of them have been discussed by Maschler et al. (1979); Funaki (1986); Chang and Kan (1992);
Chang and Driessen (1995); Chang and Lian (2002). But none of these pre-kernel catchers is useful for
our purpose, since the proposed sets, in which the pre-kernel is located, are simply too large1. This does
not mean that these sets are of no help at all, this is definitely not the case. These results are simply be too
general, they specify for each TU game a set in which the pre-kernel is located. Selecting a pre-imputation
from such a set may boost the computation of a pre-kernel element, since the possible number of iteration
steps to successfully converge to the pre-kernel diminishes by such a choice. Unfortunately, this branch
of research came to halt for more than a decade. Only recently, by the work of Solymosi (2014), this line
of research has registered again a major contribution. There, it was shown that the pre-kernel for permu-
tation games is located in the least core. This kind of pre-kernel catcher is exploitable for our purpose
to unequivocally establish that the pre-kernel is completely determined. This set is sufficiently small to
be covered by some payoff equivalence classes as identified by Meinhardt (2013d, Sec. 5.4). Establish-
ing that each imputation inside of the least core belongs to one of these payoff sets that must be mapped
by a linear transformation either to the pre-kernel or to another payoff set – which sends its imputations
to the pre-kernel – shall allow us to specify the full shape of the pre-kernel. Thus, we shall ascertain a
non-convex pre-kernel by a systematical method rather than by guesswork.
This note is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some basic definitions. Whereas Section 3
provides the concepts of the indirect function and presents a dual pre-kernel characterization in terms of
solution sets. Section 4 discusses a procedure to fully determine the pre-kernel for permutation games.
We close this note by some final remarks in Section 5 and an Appendix 6 provides crucial game data to
specify the shape of the pre-kernel.
1To get some idea how large such a set can be, we refer the interested reader to Meinhardt (2005) or http://members.
wolfram.com/jeffb/visualization/gametheory.shtml. Calculating several pre-kernel catchers can be ac-
complished with our Mathematica package TuGames 2013a.
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2 PRELIMINARIES
A n-person cooperative game with side-payments is defined by an ordered pair 〈N, v〉. The set N :=
{1, 2, . . . , n} represents the player set and v is the characteristic function with v : 2N → R, and the
convention that v(∅) := 0. Elements of N are denoted as players. A subset S of the player set N is called
a coalition. The real number v(S) ∈ R is called the value or worth of a coalition S ∈ 2N . However, the
cardinality of the player set N is given by n := |N |, and that for a coalition S by s := |S|. We assume
throughout that v(N) > 0 and n ≥ 2 is valid. Formally, we identify a cooperative game by the vector
v := (v(S))S⊆N ∈ Gn = R2|N| , if no confusion can arise, whereas in case of ambiguity, we identify a
game by 〈N, v〉.
A possible payoff allocation of the value v(S) for all S ⊆ N is described by the projection of a feasible
vector x ∈ Rn on its |S|-coordinates such that x(S) ≤ v(S) for all S ⊆ N , where we identify the |S|-
coordinates of the vector x with the corresponding measure on S, such that x(S) :=
∑
k∈S xk. The set
of vectors x ∈ Rn which satisfies the efficiency principle v(N) = x(N) is called the pre-imputation set
and it is defined by
I 0(v) := {x ∈ Rn |x(N) = v(N)} , (2.1)
where an element x ∈ I 0(v) is called a pre-imputation.
Given a vector x ∈ I 0(v), we define the excess of coalition S with respect to the pre-imputation x in
the game 〈N, v〉 by
ev(S,x) := v(S)− x(S). (2.2)
A non-negative (non-positive) excess of S at x in the game 〈N, v〉 represents a gain (loss) to the members
of the coalition S unless the members of S do not accept the payoff distribution x by forming their own
coalition which guarantees v(S) instead of x(S).
Take a game v ∈ Gn. For any pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, the maximum surplus of player i over
player j with respect to any pre-imputation x ∈ I 0(v) is given by the maximum excess at x over the set
of coalitions containing player i but not player j, thus
sij(x, v) := max
S∈Gij
ev(S,x) where Gij := {S | i ∈ S and j /∈ S}. (2.3)
The expression sij(x, v) describes the maximum amount at the pre-imputation x that player i can gain
without the cooperation of player j. The set of all pre-imputations x ∈ I 0(v) that balances the maximum
surpluses for each distinct pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j is called the pre-kernel of the game v, and is
defined by
PrK(v) :=
{
x ∈ I 0(v) | sij(x, v) = sji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
. (2.4)
The least core formalized by Maschler et al. (1979) is the 0(v)-core of the game v, where 0(v) is
the critical number at which the -core still exists, that is, for  < 0(v) the -core is empty. This critical
number is specified by
0(v) := min
~x∈I0(v)
max
S 6=∅,N
e(~x, S). (2.5)
3 A DUAL PRE-KERNEL REPRESENTATION
Theorem 3.1 (Martinez-Legaz (1996)). The indirect function pi : Rn → R of any n-person TU game is a
non-increasing polyhedral convex function such that
(i) ∂pi(x) ∩ {−1, 0}n 6= ∅ ∀x ∈ Rn,
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(ii) {−1, 0}n ⊂ ⋃x∈Rn ∂pi(x), and
(iii) minx∈Rn pi(x) = 0.
Conversely, if pi : Rn → R satisfies (i)-(iii) then there exists an unique n-person TU game 〈N, v〉 having
pi as its indirect function, its characteristic function is given by
v(S) = min
x∈Rn
{
pi(x) +
∑
k∈S
xk
}
∀ S ⊂ N. (3.1)
According to the above result, the associated indirect function pi : Rn → R+ is given by:
pi(x) = max
S⊆N
{
v(S)−
∑
k∈S
xk
}
∀x ∈ Rn, (3.2)
whereas ∂pi is the subdifferential of the function pi. Hence, ∂pi(x) is the set of all subgradients of pi at x,
which is a closed convex set. A characterization of the pre-kernel in terms of the indirect function is due
to Meseguer-Artola (1997). Here, we present this representation in its most general form, although we
restrict ourselves to the trivial coalition structure B = {N}.
The pre-imputation that comprises the possibility of compensation between a pair of players i, j ∈
N, i 6= j, is denoted as x i,j,δ = (x i,j,δk )k∈N ∈ I0(v), with δ ≥ 0, which is given by
x i,j,δN\{i,j} = xN\{ i,j}, x
i,j,δ
i = xi − δ and x i,j,δj = xj + δ
Proposition 3.1 (Meseguer-Artola (1997)). For a TU game with indirect function pi, a pre-imputation
x ∈ I 0(v) is in the pre-kernel of 〈N, v〉 for the coalition structure B = {B1, . . . , Bl}, x ∈ PrK(v,B), if,
and only if, for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, every i, j ∈ Bk, i < j, and some δ ≥ δ1(v,x), one receives
pi(x i,j,δ) = pi(x j,i,δ).
Meseguer-Artola (1997) was the first who recognized that based on the result of Proposition 3.1 a
pre-kernel element can be derived as a solution of an over-determined system of non-linear equations.
Every over-determined system can be equivalently expressed as a minimization problem. The set of global
minima coalesces with the pre-kernel set. For the trivial coalition structure B = {N} the over-determined
system of non-linear equations is given byfij(x) = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, i < jf0(x) = 0 (3.3)
where, for some δ ≥ δ1(x, v),
fij(x) := pi(x
i,j,δ)− pi(x j,i,δ) ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j, (3.3-a)
and
f0(x) :=
∑
k∈N
xk − v(N). (3.3-b)
h(x) :=
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(fij(x))
2 + (f0(x))
2 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Rn. (3.4)
For further details see Meinhardt (2013d, Chap. 5 & 6). Then one can establish the subsequent result
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Corollary 3.1 (Meinhardt (2013d)). For a TU game 〈N, v〉 with indirect function pi, it holds that
h(x) =
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(fij(x))
2 + (f0(x))
2 = min
y∈I0(v)
h(y) = 0, (3.5)
if, and only if, x ∈ PrK(v).
To identify a partition of the domain of function h into payoff equivalence classes we first define the
set of most effective or significant coalitions for each pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j at the payoff vector
x by
Cij(x) :=
{
S ∈ Gij
 sij(x, v) = ev(S,x)}. (3.6)
When we gather for all pair of player i, j ∈ N, i 6= j all these coalitions that support the claim of a
specific player over some other players, we have to consider the concept of the collection of most effective
or significant coalitions w.r.t. x, which we define as in Maschler et al. (1979, p. 315) by
C(x) :=
⋃
i,j∈N
i 6=j
Cij(x). (3.7)
Notice that the set Cij(x) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j does not have cardinality one, which is required to
identify a partition on the domain of function h. Now let us choose for each pair i, j ∈ N, i 6= j a
descending ordering of the set most effective coalitions in accordance with their size, and within of such
a collection of most effective coalitions having smallest size the lexicographical minimum is single out,
then we obtain the required uniqueness to partition the domain of h. This set is denoted by Sij(x) for all
pairs i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and gathering all these collections we are able to specify the set of lexicographically
smallest most effective coalitions w.r.t. x through
S(x) :=
{
Sij(x)
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. (3.8)
This set will be denoted in short as the set of lexicographically smallest coalitions. Given the correspon-
dence S on the payoff space we say that two payoff vectors x and y are equivalent w.r.t. the binary relation
∼ iff S(x) = S(y). This binary relation induces a partition on the payoff space. Having identified payoff
equivalence classes, we can select an arbitrary payoff vector to get a unique quadratic and convex function.
To see this, select payoff vector x from payoff equivalence class [~γ], then we get the set S(x) from which
a rectangular matrix E can be constructed through Eij := (1Sji − 1Sij ) ∈ Rn, ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j, and
E0 := −1N ∈ Rn. Notice that in this respect the characteristic vector for x ∈ Rn is given by xk = 1 if
k ∈ S and xk = 0 whenever k 6∈ S. Let q =
(
n
2
)
+ 1 combining these q-column vectors, we can construct
matrix E as a (n× q)-matrix in Rn×q, which is given by
E := [E1,2, . . . ,En−1,n,E0] ∈ Rn×q . (3.9)
A matrix Q ∈ Rn2 can now be expressed as Q = 2 ·E E>, a column vector a as 2 ·E ~α ∈ Rn. Moreover,
defining αij := (v(Sij)− v(Sji)) ∈ R ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j and α0 := v(N). Finally, the scalar α is given by
‖~α‖2, whereas E ∈ Rn×q,E> ∈ Rq×n and ~α ∈ Rq. For the details to construct the above set, matrix and
vector we refer the reader to Meinhardt (2013d, Chap. 5 & 6).
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From vector ~γ the set (3.8) is constructed and then matrixQ, column vector a, and scalar α are induced
from which a quadratic and convex function can be specified through
hγ(x) = (1/2) · 〈 x,Qx 〉+ 〈 x,a 〉+ α x ∈ Rn. (3.10)
In view of Proposition 6.2.2 Meinhardt (2013d) function h as defined by (3.4) is composed of a finite
family of quadratic and convex functions of type (3.10). For the the details, we again refer the interested
reader to Meinhardt (2013d, Chap. 5 & 6). In accordance with Theorem 7.3.1 by Meinhardt (2013d, p.
137) a dual representation of the pre-kernel is obtained as a finite union of convex and restricted solution
sets M(hγk , [~γk]) of a quadratic and convex function of type hγk , that is,
PrK(v) =
⋃
k∈J′
M(hγk , [~γk]). (3.11)
where J′ is a finite index set such that J′ := {k ∈ J | g(~γk) = 0}. In addition, g(~γk) is the minimum
value of a minimization problem under constraints of function hγk over the closed convex payoff set [~γk].
For the index set it is claimed that this minimum value is equal to zero on the closed payoff set [~γk]. The
solution sets M(hγk , [~γk]) are convex. Taking the finite union of convex sets may give us a non-convex
set. Hence, the pre-kernel set is generically a non-convex set for games with more than 4 players. By
the characterization of (3.11) we observe that it can be even disconnected. An example of a disconnected
pre-kernel were discussed by Kopelowitz (1967); Stearns (1968). This example was recently reconsidered
in Meinhardt (2013d, Sec. 8.5). According to our information, this is the sole example of a disconnected
pre-kernel investigated in the literature. However, we have found some further evidence that a disconnected
pre-kernel occurs more frequently as this example may suggest. Thus, it might be a rare event having a
null measure, but it can be materialized even though the conditions under which such an event can be
observed are still unclear. Caused by the fact that the pre-kernel is still not fully understood.
For the class of convex games and three person games we have | J′ | = 1, which implies that the per-
kernel must be a singleton. In this respect, Meinhardt (2014) has established that whenever a default game
has a unique pre-kernel satisfying the non-empty interior condition for a payoff set, then on a restricted
subset of the game space constituted by the default game and a set of related games this point is the sole
pre-kernel element. The pre-kernel correspondence is single-valued and constant on this subset.
4 DETERMINING A NON-CONVEX PRE-KERNEL
In this section we delineate a procedure of how one can conclude that the whole pre-kernel of a permutation
game has been determined. As we have outlined above, even the experienced researcher has quickly
overlooked a part of the pre-kernel. But even tough the connected parts of the pre-kernel set has been
found, it might still exist the possibility that an element or a line segment that is disconnected from the
main part of the pre-kernel has not been detected. To avoid such an accident, the resort on a good pre-
kernel catcher is indispensable. For permutation games an extremely useful pre-kernel catcher has been
discovered by Solymosi (2014). The knowledge that the pre-kernel is in the least core in connection with
some characterization results from Meinhardt (2013d) allow us to unequivocally identify the pre-kernel
for the class of permutation games.
To this end we consider a mapping that sends a point ~γ to a point ~γ◦ ∈M(hγ) through
Γ(~γ) := −
(
Q† a
)
(~γ) = −
(
Q†~γ a~γ
)
= ~γ◦ ∈M(hγ) ∀~γ ∈ Rn, (4.1)
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where Qγ and aγ are the matrix and the column vector induced by vector ~γ, respectively. Notice that
matrix Q†~γ is the pseudo-inverse of matrix Qγ . In addition, the set M(hγ) is the solution set of function
hγ . Under a regime of orthogonal projection this mapping induces a cycle free method to evaluate a pre-
kernel point for any class of TU games. We restate here Algorithm 8.1.1 of Meinhardt (2013d) in a more
compactly written form by
Algorithm 4.1: Procedure to seek for a Pre-Kernel Element
Data: Arbitrary TU Game 〈N, v 〉, and a payoff vector ~γ0 ∈ Rn.
Result: A payoff vector s.t. ~γk+1 ∈ PrK(v).
begin
0 k ←− 0, S(~γ−1)←− ∅
1 Select an arbitrary starting point ~γ0
if ~γ0 /∈ PrK(v) then Continue
else Stop
2 Determine S(~γ0)
if S(~γ0) 6= S(~γ−1) then Continue
else Stop
repeat
3 if S(~γk) 6= ∅ then Continue
else Stop
4 Compute Ek and ~αk from S(~γk) and v
5 Determine Qk and ak from Ek and ~αk
6 Calculate by Formula (4.1) x
7 k ←− k + 1
8 ~γk+1 ←− x
9 Determine S(~γk+1)
until S(~γk+1) = S(~γk)
end
Meinhardt (2013d, Theorem 8.1.2) establishes that this iterative procedure converges towards a pre-kernel
point. In view of Meinhardt (2013d, Theorem 9.1.2) we even know that at most
(
n
2
) − 1-iteration steps
are sufficient to successfully terminate the search process. However, we have some empirical evidence
that generically at most n + 1-iteration steps are needed to determine an element from the pre-kernel set
(cf. Meinhardt (2013d, Appendix A)).2
Consider the player set N = {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore, let us denote the set of all permutations of
the player set N by SN , and notice that ai,σ(i) is the valuation of situation σ(i) for player i under the
permutation σ ∈ SN . Player i is pushed in the position of player σ(i) by permutation σ. Now for each
coalition S ⊆ N one may consider all restricted permutations σ that fix the position of all players in the
complement of S, that is, we have σ(i) = i for all i ∈ N\S, and acts freely on the set of coalition S by
σ(i) for all i ∈ S. This set of restricted permutation is denoted by SS . Then a TU game 〈N, v 〉 is called
a permutation game whenever there exists a matrix A := [aij ](i,j)∈N×N such that
v(S) := max
σ∈SS
∑
i∈S
ai,σ(i) ∀ S ⊆ N, (4.2)
2Algorithm 4.1 is implemented in our MATLAB toolbox MatTuGames 2013b. The documentation of the toolbox is given
by Meinhardt (2013c) and ships with the toolbox.
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is given. In the next step consider the cyclic matrix
A =

1 7 0 6 0
1 0 2 0 1
2 6 0 7 0
0 0 1 0 2
5 3 2 4 0
 ,
as introduced in the example by Solymosi (2014), then the associated permutation game is identified by
Table 4.1.3
Table 4.1: Permutation Gamea,b
S v(S) S v(S) S v(S) S v(S) S v(S)
{1} 1 {1, 4} 6 {4, 5} 6 {2, 3, 4} 9 {1,3,4,5} 14
{2} 0 {1, 5} 5 {1, 2, 3} 11 {2, 3, 5} 9 {2,3,4,5} 14
{3} 0 {2, 3} 8 {1, 2, 4} 8 {2, 4, 5} 6 N 23
{4} 0 {2, 4} 0 {1, 2, 5} 13 {3, 4, 5} 11
{5} 0 {2, 5} 4 {1, 3, 4} 9 {1, 2, 3, 4} 16
{1, 2} 8 {3, 4} 8 {1, 3, 5} 5 {1, 2, 3, 5} 14
{1, 3} 2 {3, 5} 2 {1, 4, 5} 13 {1, 2, 4, 5} 14
a Pre-Nucleolus: {5, 5, 4, 5, 4}
a Shapley Value: {157/30, 93/20, 269/60, 93/20, 239/60}
Solymosi (2014) provided a non-convex pre-kernel solution given by the following two line segments
PrK(v) = conv {{7, 2, 7, 2, 5}, {6, 4, 5, 4, 4}} ∪ conv {{6, 4, 5, 4, 4}, {4, 6, 3, 6, 4}}. Thus, he calculated
a V-shaped pre-kernel. According to our analysis, which will be discussed below, we come up with the
conclusion that the line segment conv {{4, 6, 3, 6, 4}, {3, 8, 1, 8, 3}} got overlooked, and that therefore the
pre-kernel is literally N-shaped given as the union of the three line segments specified through:
S1 = conv {{7, 2, 7, 2, 5}, {6, 4, 5, 4, 4}},
S2 = conv {{6, 4, 5, 4, 4}, {4, 6, 3, 6, 4}},
S3 = conv {{4, 6, 3, 6, 4}, {3, 8, 1, 8, 3}}.
(4.3)
First, let us observe that the pre-kernel solution given by Solymosi (2014) cannot be the whole pre-kernel.
To this end, we consider the end points of this set, namely the points x1 := {7, 2, 7, 2, 5} as well as x3 :=
{4, 6, 3, 6, 4}. By proposition 6.6.1 Meinhardt (2013d) both points induce a convex and quadratic function
of type (3.10), and therefore two square matrices of type Q. The end point x1 induces a matrix Q1 with
full rank indicating by Lemma 6.2.2 Meinhardt (2013d) that from this point no further line segment can
be spread out, whereas for the end point x3 the induced matrix Q3 has only rank four with the orientation
{120,−240, 240,−240, 120}/449 having the same direction as the line segment S1. Hence, the function
value of h at x3 is zero, i.e. h(x3) = 0, and by Lemma 6.2.2 Meinhardt (2013d) the relation h = hx3 must
hold on payoff set [x3]. This implies that on the line segment S3 spread out by x3 we must have h(x) = 0
for all x ∈ S3. For the end point x4 := {3, 8, 1, 8, 3} the induced matrixQ4 has full rank, and by the same
reasoning as for point x1 we conclude that from this point no further line segment can be spread out. Since
the line segments S1 and S3 have the same direction we can literally speak from a N-shaped pre-kernel.
3We have written a small MATLAB program to compute from an arbitrary assignment matrix the associated permutation game.
This program can be made available upon request.
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The intended reader may want check out by herself/himself that the set S1∪ S2∪ S3 is located inside the
least core, that is, the pre-kernel catcher.
By the above argumentation we have found a connected part of the pre-kernel. But is this part also the
whole pre-kernel of the game? Does exist an additional part that is disconnected from the identified part?
To be unequivocal certain that the above solution (4.3) is the whole pre-kernel, we need to rely on the one
hand on the pre-kernel catcher of permutation games, which is the least core in accordance with Solymosi
(2014, Theorem 1) and on the other hand on Meinhardt (2013d, Proposition 5.4.1).
We start with the least core which is the convex hull of the 4 extreme points given by
LC(v) = conv {{7, 2, 7, 2, 5}, {7, 4, 5, 4, 3}, {3, 6, 3, 6, 5}, {3, 8, 1, 8, 3}}.
In view of Proposition 5.4.1 Meinhardt (2013d) the binary relation ∼ forms a partition on the domain of
function h by payoff sets. Using this result, we can identify 10 payoff sets of type [~γ] that cover the least
core, that is, LC(v) ⊆ ⋃10i=1 [~γi]. The specification of these sets have been relegated to the Appendix. By
the discussion lead in the Appendix, we observe that all imputations within the payoff sets [~γk] indexed by
k = 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 are mapped by (4.1) to one of the pre-kernel segments S1, S2 or S3. However, the
vectors of the sets [~γk] indexed by k = 3, 5, 8 are mapped to the sets indexed by k = 10, 6, 6. This implies
that within the least core all imputations are sent by Algorithm 4.1 after at most two iteration steps to a
pre-kernel element located at one of the line segments S1, S2 or S3. From this observation we conclude
that there cannot exist a disconnected pre-kernel part within the pre-kernel catcher. Therefore, we have
completely determined by (4.3) the pre-kernel as a non-convex and N-shaped set.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We illustrated a method to establish the correct shape of the pre-kernel using the least core which is the
pre-kernel catcher of permutation games, and payoff equivalence classes that cover it. This approach
demonstrates the usefulness of a tractable pre-kernel catcher to determine the full shape of a non-convex
pre-kernel. Thus, more research effort is needed to find pre-kernel catchers that would allow us to specify
the correct shape of a non-convex pre-kernel for every TU game with such a pre-kernel.
6 APPENDIX
In this Appendix we characterize the payoff equivalence classes that cover the least core and which help
us to identify the full pre-kernel. Notice that for a better reading the pairs are ordered lexicographically.
However, for computational purposes the order inside of the pairs have been reversed, this allows us to
get immediately the correct sign of the vector components. Thus, in order to get the correct sign of vector
components that sum up to an efficient payoff vector one has to reverse the order inside of each pair and the
grand coalition must be added to the sets of lexicographically smallest coalitions (cf. Meinhardt (2013d,
Sec. 6.9)).
In accordance with Proposition 5.4.1 Meinhardt (2013d) each vector x in [~γ1] induces the following
set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S1(x) ={{{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {4, 5}},
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {4, 5}},
{{2, 3}, {4, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}}.
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From the collection of lexicographically smallest coalitions matrix Q1 and column vector a1 can be de-
rived. Then the Mapping (4.1) specifies a vector ~γ∗1 in the solution set M(hγ1). By Algorithm 4.1 a
pre-kernel point will be mapped to its proper payoff set and non pre-kernel elements to a solution set con-
tained into the complement set [~γ]c of [~γ]. The solution vector {7, 2, 7, 2, 5} is located in its proper payoff
set [~γ1], recall that it is the first end point of the pre-kernel set located in the line segment S1.
For each x ∈ [~γ2] we can deduce the following set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S2(x) ={{{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {4, 5}},
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {1, 4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}},
{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}}.
Again, the Mapping (4.1) specifies a vector ~γ∗2 in the solution setM(hγ2). Once again the solution vector is
{7, 2, 7, 2, 5}, which is located in the payoff set [~γ1] and in the line segment S1 of the pre-kernel solution.
For each x ∈ [~γ3] we can deduce the following set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S3(x) ={{{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}},
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {1, 4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}},
{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}}.
The solution vector ~γ∗3 of the Mapping (4.1) is given by {563/114, 521/114, 503/114, 545/114, 245/57}
located in the payoff set [~γ10]. This vector is not a pre-kernel element.
For each x ∈ [~γ4] we can deduce the following set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S4(x) ={{{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {4, 5}},
{{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {4, 5}},
{{2, 3}, {4, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}}.
The solution vector ~γ∗4 of the Mapping (4.1) is again the pre-kernel element {7, 2, 7, 2, 5} which is located
in the payoff set [~γ1].
For each x ∈ [~γ5] we can deduce the following set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S5(x) ={{{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {4, 5}},
{{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}},
{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}}.
The solution vector ~γ∗5 of the Mapping (4.1) is given by {40/7, 32/7, 31/7, 32/7, 26/7} located in the
payoff set [~γ6]. This vector is not a pre-kernel element.
For each x ∈ [~γ6] we can deduce the following set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S6(x) ={{{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}},
{{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}},
{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}}.
The solution vector ~γ∗6 of the Mapping (4.1) is the pre-kernel element {21/4, 19/4, 17/4, 19/4, 4} located
in the payoff set [~γ7] and in the pre-kernel segment S2.
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For each x ∈ [~γ7] we can deduce the following set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S7(x) ={{{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 3}}, {3, 4}, {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}},
{{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}},
{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}}.
The solution vector ~γ∗7 of the Mapping (4.1) is the pre-kernel element {3, 8, 1, 8, 3} located in its proper
payoff set [~γ7] and in the pre-kernel segment S3. Recall that this vector is the second end point of the
pre-kernel solution.
For each x ∈ [~γ8] we can deduce the following set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S8(x) ={{{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}},
{{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}},
{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}}.
The solution vector ~γ∗8 of the Mapping (4.1) is given by {33/7, 32/7, 31/7, 32/7, 33/7} located in the
payoff set [~γ6]. This vector is not a pre-kernel element.
For each x ∈ [~γ9] we can deduce the following set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S9(x) ={{{1, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 5}, {3}}, {{1, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}},
{{1, 2, 5}, {3}}, {{2, 3}, {3, 4}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 5}}, {{3}, {1, 4, 5}},
{{3}, {1, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 5}}}.
The solution vector ~γ∗9 of the Mapping (4.1) is again the pre-kernel element {3, 8, 1, 8, 3} located in the
payoff set [~γ7] and in the pre-kernel segment S3.
For each x ∈ [~γ10] we can deduce the following set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
S10(x) ={{{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}},
{{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, {{1, 2, 5}, {1, 4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}}, {{2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}},
{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}}, {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}}.
The solution vector ~γ∗10 of the Mapping (4.1) is the pre-kernel element {21/4, 19/4, 17/4, 19/4, 4} located
in the payoff set [~γ7] and in the pre-kernel segment S2. But this point is also located in the closure [~γ10].
Hence, it is a relative boundary point.
Finally, notice that in view of Section 6.6 Meinhardt (2013d) each payoff equivalence class [~γ] induces
a set of ordered bases {e1, . . . , em} that spans the vector space E. The positive general linear group
GL+(m) is acting on the collection of all ordered bases of the vector space E, whereas a attached basis
matrix is denoted as E> ∈ Rq×m. Thus, two payoff sets are considered as equivalent if there exists a
transition matrix X ∈ GL+(m) such that E>1 = E>X holds true, with 3 ≤ m ≤ n. The group action
imposes a basis change. In this respect, we have [~γ5] ∼ [~γ6] ∼ [~γ8] ∼ [~γ10], therefore all these payoff sets
can be considered as equivalent.
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